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Abstract
We study practice variation in scheduling of cesarean section delivery across public and private
hospitals in Italy. Adopting a novel perspective, we look at the role played by patients’ preferences
for the treatment. The recursive probit model is revisited as a useful tool to assess the presence of
assortative mating of patients and provider driven by style of practice. According to our evidence the
propensity to scheduling a cesarean section is codetermined with patient self-sorting into hospital
types. We measure a significantly higher inclination to practice cesarean section scheduling in
private hospitals and conclude that assortative mating is of minor relevance in our case, even if we
cannot exclude it to be present.
Keywords practice variation, assortative mating, cesarean section scheduling, recursive probit
model
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1 Introduction
Persistent variation across geographic areas and across providers in the use of medical procedures
represents a largely unexplained basic evidence in the health economics literature. A common view is
that such pattern of variation emerges out of an asymmetric relationtioship between a subject patient
and a dominant physician basically because of the disagreement across physician groups about the shape
of the health production function, i.e. the function transforming medical care into health outcomes.
This presumption seems hard to be rejected in the case of pure regional variation [1]. When we come to
physician practice at least part of observed variation can be plausibly ascribed to a process of “assortative
mating of doctors who are aggressive with patients who prefer aggressive treatment” (Phelps [2], page
251).
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The relation between style of practice and assortative mating has been surprisingly neglected in the
literature despite its strong implications for patients’ welfare. Whenever patients share homogenous
preferences for “product” attributes, i.e. there is a single treatment that, being well informed, patients
prefer [3,4], practice variation leads to a welfare loss. In these premises Phelps and Mooney [5] suggest
that such a loss is of a comparable magnitude to the one emerging out of ex-post moral hazard in
health insurance contracts and likewise impractical to be entirely recaptured to society. Targeted
policies are invoked on a benefit-cost basis in the purpose of reducing welfare losses until marginal
benefits pair marginal costs. Huge investments in the production and dissemination of novel evidence
about the eﬃcacy of various medical procedures are quite easy to justify in this framework [2]. On
the contrary, whenever consumers have heterogenous preferences, provided they are able to identify
provider treatment styles and are free to choose accordingly, then “product variety” will improve welfare.
Ascertaining the existence of assortative mating mechanisms therefore lessens the argument in favor
of active policies aimed at reducing practice variation and at the same time provides a rationale for
policies aimed at improving patients’ awareness of providers style of practice.
In this paper we take a first step in this direction and bring into focus the main ingredients to test
for the existence of assortative mating in healthcare markets. Generally speaking, the analyzed case
should be characterized by diﬀerence in style of practice across providers, patients’ ability to observe
provider’s style of practice and quality, patients’ heterogenous preferences for alternative treatments
and free choice among alternative providers. Accordingly, the empirical model must be able to identify
sistematic variation in practice across providers net of a full set of patients covariates, and to account
for nonrandom selection of patients into hospitals. The source of the latter mechanism can be twofold:
patients unobserved frailty and patients unobserved preferences for a given treatment. We show in the
paper under which circumstances it is possible to interpret this self-selection mechanism as evidence of
assortative mating.
We deal on a case study which has attracted a massive attention in the health economics literature.
Cesarean section (CS) is one of the most common surgical procedure worldwide. In Italy and the
US it is the second most frequent procedure with respectively 200,000 and 900,000 CS performed
annualy. Quite some concern has been expressed about the increasing adoption of such a technology
for birth beyond the realm of clinical abuse. According to OECD data CS incidence rose in developed
countries from 6% in 1970 to more than 20% in 1998. This evidence conflicts with WHO (1985)
recommendations on appropriate technology for birth, suggesting that “there is no justification, in any
specific geographic region, to have more than 10-15% cesarean section births”. Similar clinical guidelines
have been proposed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality [7] and by the US Department
of Health and Human Services [8]. The conflict between clinical evidence and suggested guidelines
stimulated quite some research eﬀorts in the health economics literature to gain insights about the
reasons behind this apparent overuse. Economists’ contributions are deeply rooted into the so called
Physician Demand Induction framework, i.e. the idea that in the face of negative income shocks,
physicians may exploit their agency relationship with patients by providing excessive care [9]. Income
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shocks exploited in the literature arise from competitive pressure in the local market as measured
by variation in physician density [10], from exogenous reduction in reimbursement tariﬀs [11], from
declining fertility [12], from increasing threat of malpractice suit [13]. The role played by patients’
preferences has been left unexplored in the health economics literature despite anecdoctal evidence of
its relevance. According to MacKenzie [14] in 1996 30% of total antepartum cesarean section performed
at the John Radcliﬀe Hospital in Oxford are on maternal request. This phenomenon was almost absent
in the previous two decades. Al-Mufti et al. [15] suggest that 31% of London female obstetricians
with an uncomplicated singleton pregnancy at term would choose an elective CS for themselves. Lo
[16] provides evidence of significant increase in CS due to preferences for specific birthdays in China.A
currently prevailing wisdom in the health policy literature seems to favour the idea that obstetricians’
and patients’ preferences jointly play a major role in determing delivery procedures [17, 18].
We present in this paper novel evidence about variation in treatment style for deliveries across
two classes of providers, public and private hospitals, on a nationwide representative sample of Italian
women in childbirth. We measure treatment style as the proportion of deliveries performed by CS in
the two classes of hospitals. As it comes clear by looking at Table 1 CS rates are markedly diﬀerent
across the two classes mainly because of the private hospitals inclination to schedule CS. Conditional
on laboring CS rates are indeed quite similar. Our general conjecture is that this diﬀerence in style of
practice can be recognized by patients and drive, at least partially, a nonrandom self-sorting of patients
into the two hospitals’ types. Actually, scheduled CS cannot be viewed as a purely unilateral clinical
decision a physician makes on behalf of his patient. It is made in large advance, allowing the patient
to switch to another provider in case she disagrees with the scheduled decision. Moreover the extent
of information asymmetry involved here between the physician and his patient seems quite limited:
the set of alternative technologies for birth is small and the social knowledge about each alternative
is spread and diﬀuse also in terms of their clinical implications. Finally patients preferences for the
treatment are influenced by idiosyncratic factors like aversion to risk for the newborn, aversion to pain
and suﬀering, taste for natural processes. These general features make scheduled CS a favorable case
study for ascertaining the existence of assortative mating mechanisms. Some further aspects peculiar to
our Italian case study are worth noticing here. First of all, in the italian NHS women are completely free
to choose the treating hospital -public or private- with no out-of-pocket payments. Secondly, public
and private hospitals are naturally sorted in terms of quality and infra-structural capacity. Public
hospitals have emergency surgical capacity and newborn intensive care units (WHO [6] recommends
that ”natural deliveries after a caesarean should normally be encouraged wherever emergency surgical
capacity is available”). On the other hand, private hospitals do not have emergency room and therefore
are not allowed to admit on an emergency. Finally the presence of teaching personnel increases the
role of professional and deontic rewards in the public leading to a higher propensity to improve clinical
practices and to adopt the more appropriate ones. Because of these reasons, public hospitals are
nationwide perceived in Italy as of higher quality for delivery. We exploit this quality diﬀerence in the
interpretation of women self-selection mechanism into hospital type.
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
To motivate our empirical analysis of assortative mating in scheduled CS we develop an interpretative
model for the hospital choice and the delivery mode that incorporates the role of patient preferences
for clinical and non clinical quality, aversion to risk and pain. We consider the scheduling decision as
the possible outcome of a bargaining process between the physician and his patient. This process is
conditioned, on the physician side, by deontic reasons and adherence to professional norms, financial
incentives, overall clinical endowments in the operating hospital, fear for malpractice suit. On the
patient side, bargaining is aﬀected by preferences for the treatment, preferences for clinical and non
clinical quality.
The econometric model we adopt acknowledges the binary nature of the endogenous variable rep-
resented by treatment: planned CS versus attempt of natural delivery (ND). The analysis of practice
variation across public and private providers is performed by including among the determinants for the
probability of the treatment a dummy indicating the provider chosen by the patient, beside a set of
observable risk factors. Scheduling is jointly decided with provider choice, through an individual process
in which patients’ preferences for the alternative treatments and information on provider’s style of prac-
tice play a major role. This brings about self-selection of patients into providers based on observables
and unobservables characteristics that also determine the given treatment, making the provider dummy
variable potentially endogenous. An adequate model to represent this phenomenon is the recursive
probit model with endogenous dummy [19]. We propose a novel interpretation of it as a tool to assess
the presence of assortative mating of patients and providers. In our revisitation, the main objects of
the inference are the coeﬃcient of the potentially endogenous dummy variable indicating the chosen
provider, and the correlation coeﬃcient between the error terms of the two equations. Through the first
coeﬃcient it is possible to evaluate the existence and the extent of the diﬀerence in style of practice
across providers. The second coeﬃcient signals the presence of a self-selection mechanism operating
through unobservable variables. We explain in the paper that in presence of assortative mating both
coeﬃcients are expected to be non null.We find that the propensity to scheduling a CS across providers
is codetermined with patient self-sorting into hospital type as hinted by the battery of exogenity tests
we apply. We measure a significantly higher inclination to practice CS scheduling in private hospitals
and conclude that assortative mating is of minor relevance in our case, even if we cannot exclude it to
be present.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we elaborate an interpretative model for the hospital
choice and the delivery mode. Section 3 presents our empirical model. Section 4 illustrates our case
study, presents the estimation results and their interpretation. Section 6 contains some final remarks.
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2 Understanding the decision process for cesarean section schedul-
ing and hospital choice
We outline here a simple interpretative model for hospital choice and delivery mode. Our aim is to
emphasise the role played by patients’ preferences for the treatment. This simple model reflects some
peculiar features in our case study.
For the sake of simplicity we consider that each individual belonging to the population of women in
childbirth is described by an indicator r comprising all risk factors for a diﬃcult delivery. We assume
that the population is uniformly distributed between r and r in ascending order of risk. Women can
deliver in only two available hospitals: a private one (PR-h) and a public one (PU-h). For ease of
exposition we will consider the obstetrician and the hospital where he operates as interchangeable; in a
sense we assume that the hospital is under the complete control of the staﬀed physicians and therefore
implied agency problems are totally absent.
PU-h always provides appropriate treatments: in other words obstetricians operating there “uni-
laterally” follow professional guidelines for the purpose of gaining adequate deontic premiums (Frank
[20] discusses unilateralism in clinical decisions within the paradigm of behavioral economics). The
rule is like the following: if the women is of type r where r = r = rSPU > r then schedule her a CS
(action SPU , where S stands for “scheduled” CS and the uppercase indicates that the clinical decision
is appropriate); try a ND and therefore enter labor (action LPU , where L stands for “labor”) otherwise.
No bargaining over the treatment is accomodated by the PU-h. The obstetrician operating in the PU-h
always adopts appropriate unilateral clinical decisions, in a sense no economic argument enters their
objective function.
On the contrary PR-h obstetrician is prompt to accomodate patients’ preferences in accordance to
his own objectives and therefore to bargain with the patient under the threat of patient’s switch to the
PU-h. The obstetrician operating in the PR-h might propose to his patient an appropriate scheduled
CS (SPR), a non appropriate scheduled CS (sPR), or finally an attempt to ND (LPR). SPR is given
according to a more lenient decision rule with respect to the PU-h (i.e. rSPR < rSPU ). This is due
to staﬃng and technical equipment limitations, as generally argued by [18], in the PR-h. Therefore
appropriate scheduled CS is equally frequent across the two hospital’s types conditional on staﬃng and
technical equipment. sPR is administred according to an even more lenient rule ( rsPR < rSPR < rSPU ),
i.e. a rule that leads to a more frequent scheduling of a CS even after controlling for diﬀerences in
staﬃng and technical equipment.
Coming to the payoﬀs, as far as PU-h are assumed to behave according to automatic unilateral rules,
it is not an agent in our simple game. It simply represents the patient’s outside option. Concerning the
incentives for the PR-h we pose that by performing a SPR the hospital/obstetrician gains an economic
rent, A, comprising the anticipated diﬀential reimbursement of CS, time cost savings and lower eﬀorts
with respect to ND. Performing sPR the economic rent A is reduced by a positive amount a < A
comprising the monetary equivalent for deontic penalties suﬀered by the obstetrician that overlooks
5
his Hippocratic hoath. We assume that the deontic penalty is a decreasing function of the patient’s
risk indicator, a(r), with ar < 0. LPR is associated to a positive payoﬀ b reflecting the anticipated
economic rents, plausibly smaller than those accruing for performing a scheduled CS, net of deontic
penalties for performing a CS after labor. Therefore the payoﬀ b is definitely lower than A− a(r). We
are now able to characterize the cutoﬀ value for sPR, rsPR , as the value of women risk indicator such
that A − a(rsPR) = b. The decision to enter labor is always appropriate as far as there is no relative
convenience to its overuse: it is never administered to a high risk patient, i.e. with r > rSPR .
We finally come to describe patient’s payoﬀs and the implications these have on the outcome of the
joint decisions of CS scheduling and hospital choice. We denote with Bc the payoﬀ accruing to the
patient in case the chosen provider treats her according to a clinical action c as defined above, with
c ∈ C = (SPR, sPR, LPR, SPU , LPU ). Consider first the riskiest patients, i.e. those that have a risk
indicator r > rSPU . They will value the highest the opportunity to receive a scheduled c-setion in PU-h:
BSPU > Bc ∀c 6= SPU . The very high risk patient alwas refer to PU-h as far as, conditional on her risk
factors, she receives there an appropriate scheduled CS. Referring to PU-h is her best choice given that
higher risk patients demand good unilateral clinical decisions.
We turn to the other tail of the risk distribution, i.e. patients with r < rsPR . PR-h obstetrician is
to make them entering labor: the payoﬀ for an appropriate ND is higher than that accruing to him in
case of an inappropriate scheduled CS because of large deontic penalty. In this case, if the patient have
a strong aversion to a painful and risky ND even in the public hospital, i.e. BsPR > BLPU , (we call this
the “preference for scheduled CS” case) a bargaining between she and the private obstetrician might
emerge. Her threat of switch to the public hospital makes the bargaining over scheduled CS beneficial
for the PR-h in face of the loss of a patient. Gain from bargaining is equal to A− a(r); concomitantly,
for the patient it is equal to BsPR −BLPU . Assuming a very simple Nash bargaining framework [21] we
can state a patient with risk profile r < rsPR will refer to PR-h and receive an inappropriate scheduled
CS as far as the the following inequality is satisfied:
(A− a(r))γ · ¡BsPR −BLPU ¢1−γ > bγ · ¡BLPR −BLPU ¢1−γ
where γ represents bargaining power of the obstetricians and 1−γ that of his patient. As the bargaining
power of the physician decreases the more frequent is the scheduling of an inappropriate CS. The choice
of a PR-h and the concomitant scheduling of an inappropriate CS is therefore more (less) frequent the
lower (higher) is the bargaining power of the hospital/obstetrician, the stronger (weaker) are economic
incentives on the PR-h, the higher (lower) is patient’s riskiness, the larger (lower) is patient aversion to
pain and suﬀering.
For a patient located in the middle of the risk distribution r ∈ (rsPR , rSPU ) an interesting barganing
over treatment choice might emerge with the PR-h in case she has a peculiar preference structure given
by the following ordering of payoﬀs: BLPR > BSPR > BsPR > BLPU (we call this the “preference for ND
in private” case). Here, the patient is highly valuing non clinical quality aspects provided by a private
hospital and is willing to have a ND. In this circumstances the PR-h can be forced to bargain under
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the threat of patient’s switch. The decision not to schedule a CS (either appropriate or inappropriate)
emerges provided the following inequalities holds
Aγ · ¡BSPR −BLPU ¢1−γ < bγ · ¡BLPR −BLPU ¢1−γ for r ∈ (rSPR , rSPU )
(A− a(r))γ · ¡BsPR −BLPU ¢1−γ < bγ · ¡BLPR −BLPU ¢1−γ for r ∈ (rsPR , rSPR)
The latter inequality, referring to the less risky patients in the middle of the distribution, is more easily
met. The economic rent accruing to the provider net of deontic penalties for inappropriate planned CS
is smaller and patient gain over an admission in the PU-h is smaller as well in case an inappropriate
CS is proposed. Notice that in the “preference for ND in private” case no bargaining arises if r < rsPR
given that both agents agree on the decision to attempt to a ND.
Pattern of choices without bargaining can emerge once we consider other preference structures. For
instance, patients with medium to low risk indicator may have strong prefences in favour of a natural
and safe delivery, i.e. a ND attempted in a more endowed public hospital. We call this the “preference
for ND in public” case.
3 The empirical framework
We depict here a simple empirical framework to assess the existence of assortative mating. Coherently
with our interpretative model we start by defining a latent variable indicator s∗i = f(ri) so that the
dichotomus choice of scheduled CS vs the attempt of a ND si is observed according to the rule:
⎧
⎨
⎩
“schedule a CS”: si = 1 if s∗i > 0
“attempt a ND”: si = 0 if s∗i ≤ 0
Such a choice can be interpreted, conditionally upon risk and predisposing factors ri, as an “unilateral”,
purely deontic decision rule for a patient delivering in a public hospital. The decision rule shifts from
such a “golden standard” in case the woman chooses to deliver in a private hospital. In a sense we
consider the obstetricians operating in public hospitals as “professional leaders” setting the professional
norm the collegues operating in private hospitals look at. Assuming a parametric linear specification,
the scheduling decision emerges then according to the latent regression:
s∗i = δ1privi + f(ri) = δ1privi + δ2zi + usi (1)
where privi is a dichotomous variable indicating delivery in private hospital, zi is a vector collecting
exogenous observable risk and predisposing factors, while usi is a stochastic term capturing all the
unmeasured characteristics of the woman. The above equation reflects the outcome of a joint decision
process involving the two agents. We would like to interpret the diﬀerence in probability of scheduling in
private hospitals with respect to public as a measure of private departure from the public appropriate,
professional norm.
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However, as we argued above, the hospital choice is concomitant to the scheduling process, in some
cases even subject to strategic bargaining considerations. The woman may choose to opt out of a public
hospital admission aware of her health conditions, hospital characteristics and the clinical decision rule
adopted there. Therefore the two classes of hospital will attract women with diﬀerent preferences and
diﬀerent clinical characteristics. Some of these determinants are observed, other are not, forcing us
to consider equation 1 jointly with a hospital choice process. This process is driven by the following
stochastic latent indicator:
priv∗i = β
0
1xi + uhi (2)
and determines the observable variable privi according to the rule:
⎧
⎨
⎩
“refer to PR-h” privi = 1 if priv∗i > 0
“refer to PU-h” privi = 0 if priv∗i ≤ 0
The vector xi contains exogenous observable risk factors and socio-economic characteristics of the
woman and uhi is a stochastic error term. Omission of common unobservable variables in equations
1 and 2 introduces a correlation pattern between the two stochastic components (usi, uhi). Adding
to equations 1 and 2 the assumption that the latter are independently and identically distributed as
bivariate normal: ⎛
⎝ usi
uhi
⎞
⎠ ∼ IIDN
⎛
⎝
⎡
⎣ 0
0
⎤
⎦ ,
⎡
⎣ 1 ρ
ρ 1
⎤
⎦
⎞
⎠ (3)
results in a bivariate probit model with endogenous dummy. This model belongs to the general class of
simultaneous equation models with both continuous and discrete endogenous variables introduced by
Heckman [19]. Maddala [22] lists this (as Model 6) among the recursive models for dichotomous choice.
The recursive structure builds on a first reduced form equation for the potentially endogenous dummy
(the hospital type choice equation 2 in our case)- and a second structural form equation determining
the outcome of interest (the scheduling decision process 1).
Some hints on the interpretation of the correlation coeﬃcient ρ in our modelling exercises can be
obtained putting forward the following simplifying decomposition of the two error terms of the model:
usi = ϕ1εri + ϕ2εpi + η1i
uhi = γ1εri + γ2εpi + η2i
where εri indicates unobserved adverse clinical conditions relevant for delivery, εpi represents her un-
observable tastes in favour of a ND (like degree of aversion to pain and suﬀering, taste for natural pro-
cesses), while η1i and η2i are the residual unobserved random component of the two latent indicators,
normally distributed with zero mean, variances σ2η1 and σ
2
η2 respectively, uncorrelated with each other.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that εri and εpi are normal, zero mean, uncorrelated with each
other and with η1i and η2i, with variances σ
2
r and σ
2
p respectively. The variances of the two idiosyncratic
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components, σ2η1 and σ
2
η2 are assumed to get values making the normalization V ar(u1i) = V ar(u2i) = 1
to hold. In this setting, the correlation between the error terms of the two probit equations arises only
from the two common unobserved components εri and εpi: ρ = E(u1i, u2i) = γ1ϕ1σ
2
r+γ2ϕ2σ
2
p = ρr+ρp.
This splits the correlation coeﬃcient into two parts: the first term ρr captures a selection mechanism
related to clinical risk, the second one ρp, relates to the preferences of the woman. The coeﬃcients
γ1, γ2, ϕ1, ϕ2 are clearly not identifiable, but are inserted because speculating on their sign according
to the assumptions presented in section 2 we are able to provide some possible interpretations of the
identified correlation coeﬃcient ρ. Coherently with the discussion of the previous section we can derive
the following implications. Concerning the risk component, γ1 < 0 and ϕ1 > 0, i.e. ρr < 0. This means
that the more frail patient refer to the higher quality hospital, the public one in our case. This kind
of nonrandom selection to hospitals has been strongly evidenced by Geweke et al. [23]. Turning to the
unobservable preference component, its sign is more controversial. Recalling the alternative preference
patterns sketched above, in the “preference for schedule CS” case we expect γ2 < 0 and ϕ2 < 0. “Pref-
erence for natural in public” case is compatible with γ2 > 0 and ϕ2 > 0. Finally, in the “preference
for natural in private” case γ2 < 0 and ϕ2 > 0. If we are to discard this last pattern on the ground
of its little empirical relevance, it is possible to state that preference component ρp is positive. When
the self-sorting mechanism due to unobservable preferences can be ascribed to a recognizable practice
variation across providers, then assortative mating can be claimed to be in place. In the above context,
this implies ρp > 0 and δ1 > 0. Given that the identified parameter is ρ, the practical implementation
of a test for the presence of assortative mating is confronted with the diﬃculty represented by the
presence of the risk component ρr. The negative (positive) sign of ρ testifies that the risk component ρr
(preference component ρp) prevails upon the other. The relative importance of the two components is
an empirical matter. The richer the set of risk control available to the researcher the larger will be the
role played by the patient unobserved preference and the scope for assessing the existence of assortative
mating.
The implications for the empirical tests are the following. When the correlation coeﬃcient is found
to be statistically equal to zero, the evidence about assortative mating is inconclusive, but the resulting
exogeneity of the dummy allows to use only the treatment equation for investigating practice variation.
Second, a significant impact of provider’s dummy toghether with a positive correlation coeﬃcient testi-
fies the existence of assortative mating (while a negative correlation coeﬃcient does not allow to draw
any conclusion on this mechanism).
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4 Scheduling Cesarean Section delivery and self-selection into
hospital types in Italy
4.1 Data description
We work on a dataset coming from the “Indagine Statistica Multiscopo sulle Famiglie: condizioni
di salute e ricorso ai servizi sanitari” (ISMF), a national household survey conducted by the Italian
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) every 5 years. The last available survey was conducted from
september 1999 to august 2000 when a sample of 40119 households were interviewed. The survey
provides a full account of individual health condition, health care utilization, biometric parameters
plus socio-economic status (education, working condition) and other relevant economic variables like
complementary private health insurance holding. In this study we exploit a section of the survey
focussing on the last delivery experienced by female components of each sampled household in the
five years before the interview. Delivery experience is described in an individual self-compiled part of
the survey. Data about mode of delivery, health problems suﬀered and therapies underwent during
pregnancy and delivery are self-reported. Therefore we do not rely on approximate methods based
on administrative data, like the one used by Epstein and Nicholson [24], to identify CS scheduling.
This is critical in case of strategical miscoding. We have 5660 women filling in this section of the
survey for a corresponding number of deliveries. However, for data coeherency, we decided to use only
those delivering in the four years before the interview. We therefore ended up with a sample of 4516
observations.
We control for a full set of variables (see the following Table 2 for a list, and table A.1 in the
Appendix for descriptive statistics) including individual predisposing risk factors for CS delivery and
some socioeconomic variables. Theoretical identification of the recursive probit model is achieved as
soon as both equations of the model contains a varying exogenous regressor [25]. However, to avoid that
identification strongly relies on model’s functional form we insert among the xi the following additional
instruments: a dummy indicating whether the woman has a self-employed occupation, and a set of
dummy variables conveying information on the residential area. Given the self-compiled nature of the
questionnaire our set of risk factors do not include most of the clinical conditions usually controlled for
in the health econometrics analysis of CS variation (see for example[13]). Major lacks are controls for
breech presentation, fetal distress and prior CS. The latter variable is known to be a major predisposing
factor for CS delivery. In order to overcome this limitation we exploit information about primiparity.
However we are only able to approximately identify primiparae women. We code as primipara a woman
with no other natural children living in their family older than that the surveyed delivery refers to.
This strategy is quite plausible provided that in Italy almost all children are placed in the care of
their mother in case of parents divorce. According to this identification criterion, primiparas are about
40% of our national sample, a “realistic” proportion in Italy. We include this dummy for primiparity
and its interaction with the dummy indicating wheather the woman is aged more than 36 in a second
specification of the model. We report the estimation results for both specification as Model 1 and Model
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2 hereafter.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
4.2 Main results
Table 3 presents the main findings emerging from the following specifications: univariate probit, seem-
ingly unrelated bivariate probit, and recursive probit model. To obtain MLE of the latter models, we
resorted to the command “biprobit” of STATA 9, which exploits the Newton-Raphson maximization
method and allows for Hessian-based estimation of the asymptotic covariance matrix. Such command,
presented in STATA only for the SURE bivariate probit, sorts out the correct estimation procedure
also when one of the dependent dichotomous variable is included as a regressor for the other probit
equation, as the two models share the same log-likelihood “mechanics”. In the recursive probit model
the PRIVATE dummy proves to be positive and highly significant, picking up hospital specific factors
that increases the probability of a scheduled CS. To evaluate the exogeneity status of this dummy we
compute alternative exogeneity tests analysed in Monfardini and Radice [26]: conditional moments
(CM), diﬀerent versions of the lagrange multiplier test (LM1, LM2, LM3, LM4), likelihood ratio (LR)
and the Wald-type test based on the esimated value of the correlation coeﬃcient (RHO). As expected,
find that the dummy is endogenously codetermined with the scheduled CS equation. The battery of
exogeneity tests presented in the bottom part of the table provides conflicting indications at a first sight.
The CM, LM1, LR and RHO tests lead to strong rejection of the hypothesis of exogeneity, while LM2,
LM3 and LM4 support the opposite evidence, i.e. in favour of exogeneity of the hospital type dummy.
However, the Monte Carlo evidence presented in [26], helps in distinguishing and interpreting these
results, as the latter set of tests exhibit finite sample distributions remarkably far from the asymptotic
ones. This leads us to conclude that in our case study the bivariate endogenous dummy model is the
appropriate setting for drawing some consistent inference on hospital type diﬀerences in CS utilization
rates.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
A full account of the bivariate endogenous dummy probit estimation exercise is available in the
Appendix. For the sake of brevity we only notice here that overall results are coherent with expected
signs. Each risk factor contributes to increase the probability of scheduling a CS, while they are almost
uniformly not significant in driving hospital choice. A noticeable exception is represented by newborn
weight: babies with low weight at birth are less frequently delivered in a private hospital. Socioeconomic
variables (education) seem to be irrelevant in determining CS planning probability with the exception
of insurance holding. However, being self-employed, holding a private health insurance and being more
educated makes the woman to have a higher probability to deliver in a private hospital. The coeﬃcients
of the primipara dummies in Model 2 imply that a woman delivering for the first time is less likely to
deliver with a scheduled CS when younger than 36, but more likely to do so when aged more than 36.
In broader terms, if we restrain ourselves to the individual observable eﬀects, it seems that scheduling
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is driven, as expected, by some relevant risk factor but is less so by socio-economic variables. The
reverse applies to the decision to opt for a private admission. Even more coarsely we could say that
according to observables CS scheduling is a clinical matter and opting to a private hospital has to do
with socio-economics.
Turning to the two main coeﬃcients of interest, the following comments apply. The negative and
significant correlation coeﬃcient suggests that among the two self-selection forces we figured out in
section 3, the one related to preferences is dominated by the unobserved frailty one. This allocates the
more risky patients to public hospitals, i.e. the higher quality hospitals. The significant and positive
dummy coeﬃcient indicates that, net of observable and unobservable confoundings, we measure a
significantly higher inclination to practice CS scheduling in private hospitals. This is, as we suggested,
a precondition to interpret the correlation coeﬃcient in the light of assortative mating mechanism.
Because of its measured negative sign, we conclude that assortative mating is of minor relevance in our
case, even if we cannot exclude it to be present. It is worth noticing that according to the bivariate
SURE probit model the estimated correlation is positive and therefore apparently coherent with an
opposite interpretation of the self-selection process at work. As the SURE model is actually nested in
the endogenous dummy one, we are able to conclude that the former is rejected, with the coeﬃcient of
the dummy being significantly diﬀerent from zero. Moreover, the consequent structure is functional to
a meaningful profiling analysis of healthcare providers [27].
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
In Table 4 we look at the appropriate scheduled CS probability diﬀerentials to evaluate the impact of
the PRIVATE hospital dummy for a set of representative women. These are characterized by diﬀerent
risk factors and primiparity status. Given the lack of major risk factors in our specification, the
considered profiles describe intermediate levels of riskiness ri. Therefore, in line with our intepretative
model of section 2, these representative women may concretely switch to a private hospital. Incidentally
we notice that, coherently with our framework of section 2, the more risky woman is less likely to refer
to a private hospital. For all typical women the impact of the PRIVATE hospital dummy is positive and
significant as emerges from column (6) where we evaluate the standard error of the diﬀerence through
the Delta method. Our low risk primipara when uninsured has a probability of 8.65% of getting a
scheduled CS in public hospitals, increasing to 15.32% when she refers to a private one. It is worth
noticing here that these figures lie below the target set for low risk primiparas in the US Department
of Health and Human Resources plan “Tracking Healthy People 2010” [8]. Our assertion on public
hospitals practice as representing the appropriate, professional norm suggests to look for a measure
useful for evaluating the extent to which private hospitals move away from this golden standard. To
this purpose, we compute the percentage change of the probability of receiving a scheduled CS in private
with respect to the corresponding figure in public hospitals. For the primipara high risk woman such
percentage diﬀerence is equal to 42%. For her low risk counterpart the percent change reaches a huge
77%, i.e. almost doubled. The observed percentage diﬀerence across risk profiles is enormous indicating
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that in our case study private hospitals scheduling practice exceeds the public norm the more the less
risky is the patient.
5 Conclusions
We study practice variation in scheduling of cesarean section delivery across public and private hospitals.
In the health economics literature the prevailing approach ascribes variation in CS adoption to physician
unilateral response to a broad set of economic incentives. We adopt here a novel perspective and look
at the role played by patients’ preferences for the treatment, allowing for the presence of an assortative
mating process driven by provider style of practice. We discuss which circumstances make it feasible
an empirical assessment of assortative mating in healthcare markets and argue that our case study is
well suited to this purpose.
The econometric model adopted for the endogenous discrete variable represented by treatment is
Heckman’s recursive probit model. The analysis of practice variation across alternative providers is
performed by including among the determinants for the probability of the treatment, a dummy variable
indicating the provider chosen by the patient. The latter is determined by an individual choice process in
which patients’ preferences for the alternative treatments and information on provider’s style of practice
play a major role. This brings about self-selection of patients into providers based on observables and
unobservables characteristics that also determine the given treatment, and makes the provider dummy
variable potentially endogenous. Unobserved variables are both related to patient’s preferences and
unobserved severity conditions. The first set originates a nonrandom selection which has to do with
assortative mating, and implies a positive correlation coeﬃcient. However, this eﬀect can be partially
or totally oﬀset by a self-selection of opposite sign introduced by the second set of unobservables. The
negative sign of the latter is a mantained assumption that finds sound justification in the higher quality
of public hospitals, attracting women with more severe unobservable conditions.
In our case study on an Italian sample we obtain strong evidence against the hypothesis of exogeneity
of hospital type dummy in the equation determining CS scheduling probability. Our results suggest
that a self-selection mechanism allocating the more risky patients to public hospitals is prevailing over
the assortative mating mechanism operating through unobservable preferences for the treatment. After
controlling for observable and unobservable characteristics, women admitted to a private hospital are
more likely to receive a scheduled CS at any risk profile. Thus, working in a private hospital seems
to insulate the physicians from the adherence to a prevailing professional norm set by their public
hospital counterparts. Looking at the percentage change of the probability of receiving a scheduled CS
in private with respect to the corresponding figure in public hospitals, we find that in our case study
private hospitals scheduling practice exceeds the public norm the more the less risky is the patient.
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TABLES TO BE INSERTED IN THE MAIN TEXT 
Table 1. Cesarean section (CS) incidence across hospital types 
 
CS rate Scheduled CS rate 
CS rate 
conditional on 
laboring 
 "Market" 
Shares 
Public hospital 27.5%  16.9% 12.8%   91.4% 
Private hospital 42.4%  32.3% 14.9%     8.6% 
All 28.8%  18.2.% 12.9%  100.0% 
 
 Table 2. Variables description  
 
Variable  
Scheduled =1 if woman delivers with a scheduled cesarean section; =0 otherwise 
Private =1 if woman delivers in a private hospital; =0 otherwise 
Risk Factors Primipar                        
=1 if woman delivers for the first time; =0 otherwise 
Amniocen =1 if the woman underwent early prenatal diagnostic checks ("villi coriali" or "amniocentesi"); =0 otherwise 
Diabetes =1 if the woman self-reports having suffered from diabetes during her pregnancy; =0 otherwise 
Gestosis =1 if the woman self-reports having suffered from "gestosi" during her pregnancy; =0 otherwise 
Hyperten =1 if the woman self-reports having suffered from blood hypertension during her pregnancy; =0 otherwise 
BMI Body Mass Index (=bodyweight/(height/100)2) 
Newborn weigth weight of the newborn in kilograms 
Newborn weigth sq weight of the newborn squared 
No. scans number of fetal ultrasound scans done during pregnancy 
Hospitalization =1 if the woman was admitted to hospital during her pregnancy; =0 otherwise 
Smoked =1 if the woman was an abitual smoker; =0 otherwise 
Age +36 =1 if woman is older than 36; =0 otherwise 
Age age in years 
Agesq age squared 
 Socio-economic variables 
Edu-high =1 if woman holds an high education degree; =0 otherwise 
Edu-low =1 if woman holds a low education degree; =0 otherwise 
Edu-medium =1 if woman holds a medium education degree; =0 otherwise 
Insured =1 if the woman is covered by private health insurance 
Self-employed =1 if the woman is self-employed; =0 otherwise 
 Other controls 
NW =1 if the woman resides in a North-West region; =0 otherwise 
NE =1 if the woman resides in a North-East region; =0 otherwise 
CEN =1 if the woman resides in a Centre region; =0 otherwise 
ISL =1 if the woman resides in a Island region (Sicily or Sardinia); =0 otherwise 
Area-metropol =1 if the woman resides in a metropolitan area; =0 otherwise 
Area-suburban =1 if the woman resides in a metropolitan suburb; =0 otherwise 
Area-small =1 if the woman resides in a very small commune (less than 2000 inhabitants); =0 otherwise 
Area-medium =1 if the woman resides in a medium-small commune (between 2000 and 10000 inhabitants); =0 otherwise 
 
Table 3. Main results 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Estimation results  Estimation results 
 
private 
dummy  ρ  
private 
dummy  ρ 
 Univariate model 
Estimate 0.4342 -  0.4397 - 
St. err -0.0716 -  -0.0717 - 
 Bivariate SURE model 
Estimate - 0.2155  - 0.2176 
St. err - -0.0371  - -0.0371 
 Recursive probit model 
Estimate 1.4120 -0.5063  1.4624 -0.5292 
St. err -0.3742 -0.1838  -0.3503 -0.1714 
      
 Exogeneity tests  Exogeneity tests 
Test statistic p value  statistic p value 
CM -1.9329 0.0532  -2.0743 0.0380 
LM1 3.7732 0.0521  4.3489 0.0370 
LM2 0.0854 0.7701  0.0987 0.7534 
LM3 0.0958 0.7569  0.1100 0.7401 
LM4 0.0819 0.7747  0.0823 0.7742 
LR 4.7925 0.0286  5.4921 0.0191 
RHO -2.7540 0.0059  -3.0670 0.0020 
 
Table 4  
Predicted effect of  hospital type dummy on probability of scheduling CS 
(1) 
Woman type 
(2) 
Pr(priv) 
(3) 
Pr(CS) 
(4) 
Pr(CS|priv) 
(5) 
Pr(CS|pub)  
(6) 
Difference (s.e.) 
  
 Irrespective of primiparity (based on Model 1) 
Low risk 0.0957 0.1072 0.1767 0.0998 0.0769*** (0.0262) 
High risk 0.0585 0.3208 0.4420 0.3133 0.1287** (0.0500) 
 Primipara (based on Model 2) 
Low risk 0.0946 0.0928 0.1532 0.0865 0.0667** (0.0261) 
High risk 0.0573 0.2926 0.4063 0.2857 0.1206** (0.0522) 
 Multipara (based on Model 2) 
Low risk 0.0966 0.1276 0.2084 0.1190 0.0894*** (0.0288) 
High risk 0.0587 0.3589 0.4894 0.3508 0.1386*** (0.0518) 
 
(1)  
Low risk woman is characterized by the absence of clinical risk (all the dummy variables indicating severity of the 
pregnancy set to zero); variables age, No. scans, BMI, newborn weight set to sample averages; medium education 
degree;  without private insurance, not self-employed, delivering in 1996, residing in the North-East of Italy in a 
metropolitan area 
High risk woman differs from the previous for the following risk factors: newborn weight equal to 2.5 Kg, BMI=30, 
suffers from gestosis 
 (2)  
Marginal probability of referring to private hospital, conditional to the explanatory variables x. Conditioning to x is 
omitted from notation in all column headings. 
(3)  
Marginal probability of delivering with scheduled CS, conditional to the explanatory variables x. 
(4)  
Probability of planning c-section conditional to referring to private hospital (and to explanatory variables x), evaluated 
as: )1(/)1,1_()1|1_( ====== privprprivCSplprprivCSplpr  through the appropriate bivariate and 
univariate normal cumulative distribution function.  
(5)  
Probability of planning c-section conditional to referring to public hospital (and to explanatory variables x), evaluated 
as: )0(/)0,1_()0|1_( ====== privprprivCSplprprivCSplpr  
(6)  
The variance of the estimated difference between the two conditional probabilities has been evaluated through the Delta 
Method, exploiting analytical expressions of first order derivatives of the bivariate and univariate normal cumulative 
distribution function. The details of computation are available upon request. 
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Table A.1  
Descriptive statistics 
 Full sample  Public hospital admissions (PRIV==0)  
Private hospital 
admissions (PRIV==1) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Private 0.086 0.279  0.000   1.000  
Primipar 0.471 0.499  0.471 0.499  0.473 0.499 
Diabetes 0.019 0.137  0.019 0.135  0.023 0.151 
Gestosis 0.037 0.189  0.039 0.193  0.021 0.142 
Hyperten 0.046 0.209  0.048 0.214  0.026 0.159 
BMI 22.69 3.455  22.72 3.475  22.52 3.238 
Newborn weigth 3.263 0.509  3.265 0.515  3.239 0.437 
No. scans 5.378 2.319  5.359 2.322  5.579 2.275 
Amniocen 0.238 0.426  0.232 0.422  0.305 0.461 
Hospitalization 0.546 0.498  0.545 0.498  0.550 0.498 
Smoked 0.240 0.427  0.239 0.427  0.248 0.432 
Age 32.17 4.988  32.170 4.943  32.21 5.452 
Age +36 0.249 0.432  0.244 0.429  0.305 0.461 
Edu-high 0.108 0.311  0.103 0.304  0.168 0.374 
Edu-medium 0.467 0.499  0.464 0.499  0.499 0.501 
Edu-low 0.367 0.482  0.373 0.484  0.299 0.459 
Insured 0.157 0.364  0.155 0.362  0.176 0.381 
Self-employed 0.441 0.497  0.432 0.495  0.537 0.499 
NW 0.176 0.381  0.185 0.388  0.085 0.279 
NE 0.213 0.409  0.222 0.416  0.119 0.324 
CEN 0.158 0.365  0.161 0.367  0.124 0.330 
ISL 0.129 0.335  0.126 0.332  0.129 0.336 
Area-metropol 0.081 0.273  0.074 0.262  0.155 0.362 
Area-suburban 0.096 0.295  0.093 0.291  0.127 0.333 
Area-small 0.186 0.389  0.196 0.397  0.080 0.272 
Area-medium 0.286 0.452  0.288 0.453  0.266 0.443 
Table A.2  
Full estimation results 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Coeff. Std.err P-value  Coeff. Std.err P-value 
SCHEDULED        
Private 1.4120 0.3742 0.0000  1.4624 0.3503 0.0000 
Primipar     -0.1778 0.0524 0.0010 
Primipar +36     0.3019 0.1065 0.0050 
Diabetes 0.0055 0.1574 0.9720  0.0020 0.1597 0.9900 
Hyperten 0.1513 0.1052 0.1500  0.1470 0.1052 0.1620 
Gestosis 0.3123 0.1144 0.0060  0.3195 0.1150 0.0050 
Smoked 0.0664 0.0500 0.1840  0.0667 0.0500 0.1830 
Age +36 0.1217 0.0533 0.0230  -0.0053 0.0646 0.9340 
Hospitalization 0.0264 0.0438 0.5470  0.0310 0.0438 0.4800 
Newborn weight -1.0110 0.2324 0.0000  -0.9734 0.2334 0.0000 
Newborn weight sq. 0.1049 0.0360 0.0040  0.0986 0.0361 0.0060 
BMI 0.0285 0.0064 0.0000  0.0275 0.0065 0.0000 
Amniocen 0.0649 0.0548 0.2360  0.0598 0.0548 0.2750 
No. scans 0.0405 0.0092 0.0000  0.0414 0.0092 0.0000 
Edu-LOW -0.0843 0.0965 0.3820  -0.0618 0.0970 0.5240 
Edu-MEDIUM -0.0430 0.0972 0.6590  -0.0124 0.0982 0.9000 
Edu-HIGH -0.0351 0.1168 0.7640  -0.0050 0.1176 0.9660 
Insured 0.1489 0.0612 0.0150  0.1438 0.0613 0.0190 
NW -0.2202 0.0747 0.0030  -0.2067 0.0741 0.0050 
NE -0.2470 0.0714 0.0010  -0.2361 0.0706 0.0010 
CEN -0.0760 0.0714 0.2870  -0.0699 0.0707 0.3230 
ISL -0.0915 0.0719 0.2030  -0.0843 0.0718 0.2400 
Year 1997 -0.0152 0.0647 0.8140  -0.0084 0.0647 0.8970 
Year 1998 0.0646 0.0630 0.3050  0.0628 0.0630 0.3190 
Year 1999-00 0.0802 0.0625 0.1990  0.0774 0.0624 0.2150 
Constant 0.2600 0.4234 0.5390  0.2806 0.4249 0.5090 
        
PRIVATE        
Primipar     -0.0120 0.0682 0.8600 
Primipar +36     0.0215 0.1261 0.8640 
Diabetes 0.1958 0.1878 0.2970  0.1988 0.1876 0.2890 
Hyperten -0.1648 0.1683 0.3270  -0.1631 0.1682 0.3320 
Gestosis -0.2018 0.1934 0.2970  -0.2038 0.1928 0.2910 
Newborn weight 1.0577 0.4482 0.0180  1.0567 0.4461 0.0180 
Newborn weight sq. -0.1793 0.0697 0.0100  -0.1792 0.0695 0.0100 
BMI -0.0120 0.0088 0.1760  -0.0123 0.0088 0.1630 
Amniocen 0.1260 0.0679 0.0630  0.1246 0.0681 0.0670 
No. scans 0.0193 0.0112 0.0860  0.0194 0.0112 0.0840 
Edu-LOW 0.2799 0.1508 0.0630  0.2814 0.1503 0.0610 
Edu-MEDIUM 0.4662 0.1499 0.0020  0.4679 0.1500 0.0020 
Edu-HIGH 0.6312 0.1630 0.0000  0.6334 0.1636 0.0000 
Age -0.1013 0.0475 0.0330  -0.1079 0.0478 0.0240 
Age sq. 0.0015 0.0007 0.0350  0.0016 0.0007 0.0270 
Insured 0.1881 0.0764 0.0140  0.1898 0.0763 0.0130 
Self-employed 0.1341 0.0594 0.0240  0.1316 0.0596 0.0270 
NW -0.7040 0.0970 0.0000  -0.7024 0.0975 0.0000 
NE -0.5204 0.0895 0.0000  -0.5186 0.0895 0.0000 
CEN -0.5119 0.0895 0.0000  -0.5093 0.0898 0.0000 
ISL -0.2110 0.0838 0.0120  -0.2115 0.0837 0.0110 
Area-metropol. 0.4264 0.0925 0.0000  0.4256 0.0923 0.0000 
Area-suburban 0.2424 0.0934 0.0090  0.2406 0.0929 0.0100 
Area-small -0.3022 0.0955 0.0020  -0.3031 0.0952 0.0010 
Area-medium -0.0075 0.0685 0.9130  -0.0096 0.0683 0.8880 
Constant -1.3403 1.0324 0.1940  -1.2005 1.0383 0.2480 
ρ -0.5063 0.1838   -0.5292 0.1714  
 
 
